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Accounting for Experience:  
Phenomenological Argots and Sportive Life-Worlds 
by Dr John Hughson and Dr David Englis 
 
According a to a certain position formulated within the philosophical school of post-structuralism, attempts 
to reconstruct forms of consciousness are themselves textual fabrications, and should be relinquished in 
favour of other, more 'textual' forms of analysis. This paper argues that phenomenologists should not reject 
this critique outright, for it compels them to think more carefully about the appropriateness of particular 
terminologies for the representation and comprehension of particular life-worlds. To this end, the vocabulary 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is delineated and considered as to its appropriateness for the study of sportive life-
worlds in particular, and that of soccer play more particularly. A Merleau-Pontian analysis of the latter is 
offered, and it is contended that whilst certain problems are attendant upon its use, it nonetheless stands as a 
vital resource for understanding such a form of activity.
Introduction 
The central purpose of any phenomenological 
explication of human activity is to represent the 
particularities of the modes of consciousness 
characteristic of the people under investigation. 
This project immediately raises a series of 
dilemmas. How is an external analyst to capture 
the nuances of those forms of being and 
experience that are constitutive of someone else's 
life? Is it possible fully to replicate phenomena - 
in this case, other persons' orientations to the 
world - when the very world that they experience 
is analytically assumed to be not a pre-given and 
static entity open to scrutiny by anyone, but to be 
constituted by those persons' particular existential 
conditions? What are the criteria by which we 
might measure the accuracy or otherwise of the 
account offered by the analyst of the life-world of 
the people under consideration? 
The issue of translating experience into writing 
has been further problematised by authors 
working within the post-structuralist school of 
philosophy. According to the work of Derrida 
(1976, 1978), which has been very influential in 
the humanities and to some degree in the social 
sciences too, it is foolhardy to believe that texts 
can represent any reality beyond themselves. The 
truths propounded by texts are precisely textual 
truths, that have no validity beyond the literary 
rhetorics upon which texts are based. This form 
of post-structuralism therefore seeks to identify 
the 'bad faith' of texts which claim to represent 
phenomena beyond their own boundaries, as such 
texts are engaged in a dissembling of their own 
true nature, namely that they do not represent but 
rather construct that which they purport to bring 
into view. The implication of this position for 
phenomenological projects which seek to 
explicate particular modes of consciousness is 
that these latter are betrayed once they are re-
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presented textually. This is because the analyst's 
text is a device which cannot represent the 
particularity of those modes of consciousness, 
but which reconstructs semblances of these that 
have no intrinsic or meaningful relationship to 
the phenomena they are supposed to be 
representing.  
Derrida's position poses a stark either/or choice: 
either we admit that all textual accounts are 
textual fabrications, or we are guilty of 
dissembling the true nature of the situation. 
However, we can reject such a black and white 
view of things in favour of accepting the point 
that language does contain rhetorical properties, 
and that it does have the power - to some extent - 
to shape the objects it recounts. We can also 
dispute the extreme claim that what texts point to 
is only ever other texts, and replace it with a 
series of reflections on which types of 
terminology might be adopted such that the 
particularity and haecceity (just-this-ness) of the 
phenomena under investigation are not rent 
asunder. This is a problematic based on the view 
that some terminologies might be better than 
others for the purpose of describing certain 
things. The task, then, is to examine different 
terminologies through which phenomena may be 
rendered into written language, analyse their 
conceptual and verbal components, and consider 
how they may or may not be geared towards 
usefully grasping particular forms of 
consciousness. 
This paper is concerned with interrogating one 
particular phenomenological terminology in light 
of the desiderata set out above. The position we 
will consider is that provided by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. The particular interest of 
Merleau-Ponty's specific analytic idiom lies in its 
stress on the role the human body plays in the 
constitution and reproduction of modes of 
consciousness, and therefore of the experiential 
contours of particular life-worlds. Both of the 
current authors have research interests in the 
study of sportive practices, and more particularly, 
the ways in which sports-people experience the 
movement of their bodies as they partake in 
sportive processes. Thus after we have set out the 
main elements of Merleau-Ponty's position, we 
will turn towards the key argument of this paper: 
that his terminology is particularly well-suited 
towards the explication of how the human body 
and the spaces that surround it are 'felt' by the 
sports-person in motion. We will take the 
example of soccer players as the main exemplar 
of how the Merleau-Pontian argot can be used to 
reconstruct such modes of participative 
experience. 
The Language of Merleau-Ponty 
The trend in phenomenology after Husserl's 
(1982, 1989) foundational contribution which 
attempted to reconstruct the contours of 
consciousness-in-general, was towards locating 
the consciousness of a given subject in time and 
space (Luijpen, 1969; Lauer, 1965). This focus 
on the thrown-ness of consciousness, its 
inevitable positioning within a particular place, is 
a central theme of Heidegger (1988), from whom 
Merleau-Ponty took much inspiration. Merleau-
Ponty's innovation was his systematic emphasis 
on the notion that both perception and awareness 
are fundamentally rooted in the body of the 
particular human subject. The visual field open to 
the subject is not just perceived but is thoroughly 
constituted by, and from, the perspective of a 
subject who possesses a body. In other words, 
consciousness is always and everywhere situated, 
both physically and existentially. From this 
perspective, all human subjects are body-
subjects. This concept goes beyond the intuitive 
claim that a subject merely has a body. Instead, 
the idea of body-subject is an attempt to express 
linguistically the condition Merleau-Ponty took 
to be a basic characteristic of human life, namely 
that subjectivity and the body are not just 
interrelated, but completely indissociable. In this 
argot, the body is the subject and the subject is 
the body.  
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Just as 'mind' and 'body' are seen to be 
interpenetrating entities rather than isolated and 
separate substances, so too on Merleau-Ponty's 
account are the human being and the world s/he 
inhabits thoroughly bound up with each other. 
Merleau-Ponty's (1968) terminology points to a 
situation whereby the body-subject is constituted 
by his or her life-world, and the life-world is 
constituted by the body-subject. Consciousness is 
seen to penetrate the 'world', and the 'world' 
likewise is seen to penetrate consciousness. Thus 
if the life-world is equated with the body-
subject's visual field, the visual field constitutes 
the body-subject just as, simultaneously, the 
body-subject constitutes the visual field 
(Schmidt, 1985). The way Merleau-Ponty (1965: 
168-9) expresses this situation is through a 
description of the mutual constitution of body-
subject and field as a ‘dialectic of milieu and 
action’.  
This view has certain important ramifications for 
how the consciousness of body-subjects is to be 
understood. According to Merleau-Ponty, the 
primordial condition of the body-subject is 
understood as being prior to reflective 
consciousness. This primal condition does not 
involve the body-subject possessing a reflective 
consciousness, for the body-subject itself is a 
form of practical consciousness. A body-subject 
has as part of its very being forms of practical 
knowledge of how to operate in its field, and 
knows how to act on the basis of that knowledge. 
The claim here is that the abstract modes of 
thought involved in reflective consciousness are 
secondary products, generated on the basis of the 
pre-reflective modes of knowing and doing 
characteristic of the primitive existential 
condition of the body-subject.  
Now that we have outlined in brief Merleau-
Ponty's terminology, we can see why according 
those who havetaken up his ideas, he can be said 
to have provided a general language that can be 
used to investigate particular species of embodied 
doing and being (Crossley, 1995). 
Phenomenological analysis on this view seeks to 
reconstruct the contours of the ‘lived’ spaces 
created and experienced by particular body-
subjects in their practical orientations towards the 
world (Merleau-Ponty, 1996). The utility of any 
terminology which seeks to explicate forms of 
consciousness can only be assessed on the basis 
of how well it might be judged to deal with 
particular modes of orientation towards and 
within a given life-world. We will now turn to 
present Merleau-Ponty's lexicon as a useful 
means of conceptualising a particular instance of 
sportive practice, namely how soccer players 
orient themselves while playing their sport. Here 
we shall portray what we take to be the benefits 
of a Merleau-Pontian account of such matters. 
Towards the end of the paper, we will indicate 
some of the problems that arise from adopting 
such an account.  
Soccer Sensibilities 
Merleau-Ponty himself directed his attention, 
albeit very briefly, to issues surrounding the 
experiential modes of soccer spaces. In an early 
work, The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty 
(1965) used the soccerfield as an example of 
how, in general terms, a body-subject orients and 
is oriented to the spatial dynamics of her visual 
field. Merleau-Ponty (1965: 168-9) described 
how the player ‘plays’ the game in this way: 
For the player in action the soccer field is not an 
‘object’, that is, the ideal term which can give 
rise to an indefinite multiplicity of perspectival 
views and remain equivalent under its apparent 
transformations. It is pervaded with lines of force 
(the ‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the 
‘penalty area’) and is articulated into sectors (for 
example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries) 
which call for a certain mode of action and which 
initiate and guide the action as if the player were 
unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, 
but present as the immanent term of his practical 
intentions; the player becomes one with it and 
feels the direction of the ‘goal’ for example, just 
as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal 
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planes of his own body. It would not be sufficient 
to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu. At 
this moment consciousness is nothing in than the 
dialectic of milieu and action. Each maneuver 
undertaken by the player modifies the character 
of the field and establishes new lines of force in 
which the action in turn unfolds and is 
accomplished, again altering the phenomenal 
field. As we noted before, the point being made 
here about the general nature of body-subjects in 
the fields they operate within, is that there exists 
a 'dialectic of milieu and action', a constant 
intertwining of the consciousness of the body-
subject and the field in which s/he acts. As a 
result, there is a process whereby simultaneously 
the body-subject constitutes the field, whilst the 
field constitutes the practical consciousness of 
the body-subject. 
Merleau-Ponty saw the soccer field as a telling 
example of the general point he wanted to make 
about the nature of practical activity. However, 
the example can be used as the basis for a 
substantive account of the nature of soccer play. 
This is so if we reread the above quotation as an 
analysis of the experiential mode of a player-
body-subject, that is a soccer player whose 
corporeal being we can identify using Merleau-
Ponty's lexicon. Given this descriptive device, we 
can then begin to explicate the nature of the 
player-body-subject’s life-world and how s/he 
moves within it. Following the logic of Merleau-
Ponty's diagnosis of the nature of body-subjects 
and fields in general, we can then describe the 
arena of soccer play in the following 
phenomenological terms. The life-world of the 
player-body-subject is the soccer field as it is 
viewed and experienced by the former. Since the 
field is constituted by the player-body-subject, it 
is his or her 'property'. But so too does the field 
constitute the player-body-subject. Both the 
player-body-subject and the soccer field are 
mutually creative of each other. Viewed in this 
way, soccer play is not the result of the 
perceptions and reactions of a form of 
consciousness that is reflective. Instead, play is 
generated by a pre-reflective consciousness, 
which in its very essence is itself constituted by a 
‘dialectic of milieu and action’.  
From this perspective, the player ‘feels’ the 
direction of the different parts of the pitch, for 
example the movement towards the goal area, as 
much as s/he experiences the endowments of her 
own body. That is to say, he or she ‘knows’ the 
pitch not at the level of reflection but at the level 
of pre-reflective, practical engagement. The 
player's actions are generated on the basis of that 
form of practical understanding. Play can thus be 
seen as a flow of embodied practical activities 
rather than as a series of discrete actions presided 
over and adjudicated by a reflecting 
consciousness. The player-body-subject does not 
carry out ‘strategies’, if these are defined as the 
results of reflective monitoring and decision. 
Instead, the player-body-subject practically 
produces ‘moves’, which are felt (rather than 
thought) to be compelled by the spatial contours 
of the soccer field. As these contours are also 
'felt' by the player-body-subject, they are 
transformed into dynamics of space, in this case 
the space of the soccer field. Thus there pertains 
a fundamental relationship between the dynamics 
of the perceived pitch, and the movements that 
the player-body-subject enacts. Both player and 
field are in movement together, the one orienting 
and reorienting the other simultaneously and 
constantly as long as the player is playing. The 
succession of ‘moves’, the very substance of play 
itself, constantly lead to reconfigurations both of 
the dynamics of the field, and of the subsequent 
moves 'demanded' of the player by those 
dynamics. Those dynamics are, of course, 
produced by the permanent interpenetration of 
the body and the field. The notion of there being 
a stream of play encapsulates the rhythm of play 
on the pitch. Whilst the player sometimes has to 
perform relatively 'discrete' movements - e.g. to 
stop running with the ball in order to take aim at 
a target - such activities are only relatively rather 
than absolutely distinct from the flow of play that 
preceded them and follows them. The 
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terminology used to describe forms of play must 
therefore draw upon metaphors of processual and 
on-going movement, and not fall into the trap of 
utilising language that conveys a false impression 
of jerky, stop-start forms of motion. 
Enter the Star Player 
Thus far we have set out a framework that sets 
out what we take to be the nature of soccer 
player-body-subjects in general. However, 
empirically speaking, there are many different 
types of player in the world of soccer, and many 
different types of play. Forms of play and player 
vary in terms of levels of expertise and types of 
play. For example, there are quite clearly 
differences in the bodily dispositions of world-
class players like Pelé or David Beckham, and 
amateur players who partake in informal games 
on a Saturday afternoon Moreover, there are also 
important national and regional differences in 
styles of play, with the bravura style of the 
Brazilian national team contrasting greatly with 
the more stolid characteristics of the German or 
Dutch teams. We have examined the aesthetics of 
variant forms of play elsewhere (Inglis and 
Hughson, 2000).  
Here we will give an indication of how a 
Merleau-Pontian terminology can be used for 
phenomenologically reconstructing the 
experience of play as felt by one particular type 
of soccer player, namely the international'star 
player' who is highly regarded by pundits and 
fans alike. From our researches in this area thus 
far, we would argue that the form of practical 
knowledge such players possess, and the types of 
movement engendered thereby, are best 
described as exhibiting very high levels of kinetic 
economy. Such a property of play is described 
well by the philosopher David Best (1995: 382), 
when he describes this as involving ‘actions 
which … approach … the ideal of totally concise 
direction towards the required end of the 
particular activity’, the latter being, of course, 
scoring goals. Best goes on to argue that this kind 
of play involves a ‘unified structure which … [is] 
the most economical and efficient method of 
achieving the required end’ (ibid., 383).  
Best's use of the word 'structure' here is a little 
problematic, because the static and mechanistic 
connotations it throws up do not do full justice to 
the shape of such play. However, this can be 
rectified by recourse to the Merleau-Pontian 
terms suggested above, replacing such a brittle 
form of expression with descriptors such as 
'stream' and 'flow' to describe the on-going 
process of play. Nevertheless, Best's description 
above does effectively capture what we have 
adduced from careful study of the movements of 
the famous names in international soccer: that 
they are possessed of an ability to avoid 
expending extraneous energy in their traversal of 
the pitch, being wholly focused on the particular 
end they are oriented towards. Elsewhere we 
have written of the peculiar physical beauty of 
this form of movement (Hughson and Inglis, 
2002). The important point here is that there does 
indeed seem to be a star player type of player-
body-subject, who is possessed of a mode of 
practical knowledge and capacities for movement 
that do seem to be different in certain ways from 
those held by other - 'less gifted' - players. Thus 
from the point of view of a form of external 
analysis - identifying a type of player and 
watching their corresponding forms of movement 
- we feel confident in claiming that there is 
indeed a star player form of soccer play that can 
be phenomenologically reconstructed.  
Our researches have thus far focused on French 
players of this type, top-level French stars being 
known for their particularly dramatic (and for 
Anglo-Saxon tastes, over-dramatic!) style of 
play. The capacities of top-level French players 
are interestingly delineated in the following 
thoughts attributed to the former French 
international squad member, Eric Cantona: 
To create the moment. To step out of 
time. To create space from nothing. To 
be truly spontaneous. This is the fate of 
the [great] footballer. He must be 
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surrealist and realist, a magician and a 
scientist (cited at Blacker and 
Donaldson, 1997: 15) 
If we downplay the oratorical flourishes so 
beloved of this particular individual, the passage 
does illustrate an important point about the type 
of play enacted by a (French) star player. 
Someone like Cantona can, in a sense, 'create 
space from nothing'. He can locate paths through 
the opposition's defence ranks, and discover ways 
of scoring goals, that in a very literal sense are 
shut off to other types of player on the field. The 
star player can be seen to create spaces which 
could not be created or even imagined by other 
players who do not possess the same type of 
skills.  
Many commentators have remarked that 
Cantona's fellow French international, Zinedine 
Zidane, seems also to be possessed of this sort of 
dazzling ability. As Gibbons (1999: 38) has 
noted: 
Among Zidane’s range of extraordinary 
talents, perhaps the most precious is a 
chilling ability to disappear in front of 
55,000 people, suddenly materialising 
in places far from where opposing 
defenders are stationed. 
Zidane not only has the capacity to elude rival 
defenders, he also apparently has the power 
momentarily to escape the gaze of spectators by 
appearing like a phantom in unexpected places, 
and in so doing, he creates havoc among the 
opposition. Star players can therefore be 
understood in the terms de Certeau (1984: 93) 
invokes apropos of another type of practitioner: 
they 'make use of spaces that cannot be seen' by 
others. An 'artist' of soccer play like Zidane can 
create spaces denied to others, by calling upon a 
particular repertoire of playing skills, as he 
weaves around the contours of a pitch, the 
dynamics of which pulse through his body. When 
asked about such issues in interviews, Zidane is 
generally rather at a loss as to what to say. 
Questioned about one particularly spectacular 
goal that he engineered, he replied in this way: 
… I ask myself, how did I do that?! 
They [my fellow players] were just as 
surprised as I was. You can make that 
particular move a hundred times, but 
only once might it work … [After the 
match] I looked at it again [on video], 
although I generally don't tend to watch 
replays of my games. But that particular 
move, I watched it fifteen times, in order 
to dissect it. And it is beautiful! It is so 
beautiful!Here we can see that faced 
with a demand to explain precisely how 
he carried out sucha maneuver, 
Zidane's mastery deserts him. All he 
can do is point to the beauty of what he 
has achieved, rather than be able to tell 
us in detail the resources that he could 
draw upon to that end. We are here 
faced with the paradox of how a master 
of his art cannot explain in words how 
that art works or where it comes from.  
The Limits of Understanding 
So far, we have presented the benefits we take to 
accrue from adopting a Merleau-Pontian 
terminology to reconstruct what is happening 
when soccer players enter the field. We have seen 
that it provides us with a lexicon through which 
the comments of soccer players as to their own 
forms of play can be made sense of. In particular, 
it allows us to think about soccer play in terms of 
a pre-reflective 'stream' of movements stimulated 
by, and in turn reconfiguring, the life-world of 
the soccer field. However, no position can ever 
honestly be said to be perfectly attuned to the 
subject matter it is being used to comprehend. In 
this section we will identify problems that we 
have come up against in our deployment of this 
brand of phenomenology for our particular 
subject matter.  
In studying any aspect of human consciousness 
phenomenologically, one is faced with the 
problem of an object of analysis that potentially 
always slips through one's fingers as one tries to 
grasp it. If the analyst asks the person under 
study to describe what she is doing when 
engaged in a particular activity, the risk is not 
only that the formal interview process may skew 
the response in ways that invalidate it as a good 
description of the existential condition of that 
activity. The danger is also that, even if the 
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interview - or other form of data collection - does 
not impinge seriously on the account offered by 
the subject, nonetheless she will in one way or 
another be compelled to express it in a formalised 
discourse that bears little relation to, and obeys 
different logics than, the mode of practical 
knowledge that informs the activity the analyst 
wishes to know about. In this way, the analyst 
ends up with an account of practice out of which 
all the elements of practical knowledge have 
leaked (Bourdieu, 1996).  
These dilemmas have faced us in our attempts to 
understand 'from within' the activity of star 
player type soccer. The problem is compounded 
by the fact that the Merleau-Pontian approach we 
have adopted compels us to try to 'get inside' not 
just the heads of such players, but their bodies 
too (as it were). Here we run up against the age-
old divide between the 'man (or woman) of 
action' and the 'man (or woman) of letters', each 
possessed of mastery of a realm governed by 
different exigencies. The study of sport 
phenomenologically by and large requires an 
interrogation of the conditions of possibility of 
the activities of the former, and arguably involves 
even more problems than the study of the latter. 
This is because analysis of the latter involves (in 
part) putting first-order discourses of subjects 
into the second-order discourses of the analyst 
(Schutz, 1967). It is perhaps less difficult to 
perform that sort of operation, than to translate 
more directly and expressly corporeal practices 
into language, especially given the fact that 
subjects themselves experience difficulties in 
making such a translation of their own practices 
into words. If the analyst is at a certain distance 
from other people's words, s/he is arguably at an 
even greater distance from their corporeal 
activities. 
Thus we acknowledge that the material we 
presented above involves many sorts of 
methodological dilemmas. Even if we were to 
carry out face-to-face interviews with soccer 
players, the problems associated with such a 
method of data gathering would still be with us, 
and made more problematic because the 
phenomena we are interested in are corporeal in 
nature, and therefore are perhaps particularly 
resistive to being put into discursive terms. We 
saw this in the case of the interview with Zidane. 
He knows what he is doing practically, for when 
he is on the pitch he is required to act as a body-
subject, and one possessed of certain knowledges 
that allow him to make moves that others cannot. 
Whilst he is also a body-subject in the interview 
room, such a context requires different, more 
verbal, skills. As his capacities for mastering an 
environment lie in another, more directly 
corporeal, direction, he seems rather at sea in a 
life-world where words are the phenomena to be 
oriented towards, not soccer balls Thus the 
reconstruction by the analyst of what Zidane 
feels when playing soccer, is particularly fraught, 
for it involves setting out in words corporeal 
experiences he himself finds difficulty in 
expressing verbally.  
Paradoxically, then, the theoretical strength of a 
Merleau-Pontian approach to studying forms of 
practice, its emphasis on the need to think about 
the embodied nature of activities, actually 
compounds the methodological problems 
associated with all forms of investigation which 
seek to delineate the nature of experience. By 
seeking to set out modes of embodied experience, 
a Merleau-Pontian approach can founder on the 
rocks of its own ambition. The search for the 
fine-grained details of someone's life-world is 
difficult enough. With an added emphasis on the 
corporeal aspects of that life-world, and the 
forms of consciousness intertwined with it, a 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology compounds 
still further the dilemmas facing the analyst. 
Conclusion 
We have sought in this paper to challenge the 
post-structuralist idea that any kind of 
phenomenological enterprise that seeks to 
reconstruct particular modes of consciousness 
ought to be abandoned. If the phenomenologist's 
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text does not represent that which it purports to 
depict, but in fact fabricates merely an imaginary 
version of that object, then that text would indeed 
only have value as symptomatic evidence of that 
scholar's naivety, if not also his or her bad faith. 
We suggest that instead of accepting such a stark 
choice between abandoning phenomenological 
investigations altogether, or completely ignoring 
the post-structuralist critique and carrying on as 
normal as if nothing has happened, contemporary 
phenomenological scholarship would do well to 
reflect on how well competing terminologies can 
be deployed to grasp particular subject matters. 
Our position is that there is no single way of 
testing the utility or otherwise of a particular way 
of describing life-worlds, nor can one ever state 
with complete confidence that a particular 
terminology is without merits. Instead, one has to 
consider carefully how a particular lexicon 
available for analytic use can be drawn upon to 
describe particular life-worlds, and to assess how 
well that manner of representation deals with the 
particular modes of being and doing under 
consideration. Does it tell us anything new about 
the life-world being investigated? Does it capture 
well the detailed features of a form of life? Does 
it miss out or misrepresent phenomena that for 
other reasons we might take to be important in 
the particular context under scrutiny?. 
We have described above some of the 
methodological pitfalls a Merleau-Pontian 
terminology can lead us towards. Nonetheless, 
despite these quandaries, we believe that the 
study of sports in general, and soccer in 
particular, still gains a great deal from an 
adoption of the terminology set out by Merleau-
Ponty. If one did not have a Merleau-Pontian 
emphasis on the intertwined nature of the mental 
and the bodily, one would end up with a very 
queer view of how sportive practices actually 
occur. Lacking such an outlook, we might be 
tempted to take at face value the discursive 
elaborations of sports-people as to their sporting 
activities. This approach would ignore the 
qualitative differences between a discourse made 
up of post hoc rationalisations as to how and why 
certain movements are enacted in sport, and the 
practical, largely pre-reflective knowledges 
drawn upon in the actual flow of sportive 
movement. Phenomenology in general rightly 
draws attention to the practical, pre- or non-
reflective aspects of many activities. The 
Merleau-Pontianterminology shows how such 
knowledges are always in one way or another 
interwoven with modes of bodily deportment and 
forms of 'bodily knowing'.  
Such a focus is arguably crucial for a more 
realistic understanding of sportive phenomena, 
for without it many of the elements of sport that 
make it different from other activities would be 
lost to analysis, and the particularities of bodily 
comportment within particular sports might go 
unexamined. 
In our researches, we have found that a Merleau-
Pontian phraseology has been an invaluable 
means for us to pull together and to make sense 
of the empirical materials we have gathered on 
the game of soccer. We believe that 
Merleau-Ponty's concepts provide a very useful 
framework through which we can develop further 
analysis in this area. We have not yet 
investigated, for example, how different star 
players perceive each other, both in the same 
team and in the opposition, and how they deal 
with such a potentially threatening presence. 
Although Merleau-Ponty's remarks on soccer did 
not encompass this area, nonetheless his ideas are 
very conducive towards providing the means to 
describe the ways in which bodies come together 
and separate on the field of play, sometimes in 
violent combat with each other and sometimes in 
euphoric celebration. These and other features 
both of soccer in particular and of other sports 
too, await uncovering by Merleau-Pontian tools. 
Soccer is often dubbed 'the beautiful game'. We 
believe that its beauty can be further discovered 
and admired if the appreciative analyst has 
Merleau-Ponty's glossary at his or her disposal.   
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